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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE: AN EVALUATION
OF THE MISSOURI EXPERIENCE
JAM s E. WESTBROOK*

I. INTRODUCTION
Following the lead established by Missouri in 1875, constitutional

home rule provisions have been enacted in more than half of the states..
Despite repeated statements that home rule has failed to accomplish its
avowed purposes, 2 it has shown a continuing vitality. Since 1950, home
rule provisions have been adopted in Rhode Island, Louisiana, Tennessee,

Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, South Dakota, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.
The voters of New York approved a comprehensive revision of that state's
home rule provision in 1963. Fifteen Missouri municipalities with a total
1960 population of approximately 1,743,542 operate under home rule charters.5 This is considerably more than half of Missouri's urban population. 6
*Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-

Columbia, School of Law.
1. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 9; Aaiz. CONsT. art. XIII, § 2; CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 8; COLO. CONsT. art. XX, §§ 1, 6; CONN. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CoNsT.
art. VIII, § 11; GA. CONST. art XV, ch. 2-83; HAWAn CONsT. art. VII, § 2; KAN.

XII, § 5; LA. CONsT. art. XIV, § 40; MASS. CoNsT. art. II, § 6; MD.
CONsT. art. XI-E, § 3; MIcH. CONsT. art. VIII, § 21; MINN. CoNsT. art XI, § 3;
Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 18(a), 19, 31; NEB. CoNsT. art XI, § 2; NEV. CoNST. art.
VIII, § 8; N.M. CoNsT. art. X, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2; OHIo CONST.
art. XVIII, § 7; OKLA. CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3(a); ORE. CONsT. art. XI, § 2; PA.
CONST. art. XV, § 1; R.I. CONST. amend. XXVIII, § 2; S.D. CONsT. art. X, §§
4, 5; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9; TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONsT. art. XI,
§ 5; WASH. CoNsT. art. XI, § 10; W.VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 39(a); Wisc. CONST.
art. XI, § 3.
2. E.g., CHIcAGo's GOVERNMENT-REPoRT OF THE CHICAGO HOME RULE
CoMMissioN (1954); Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 27 (1956); Walker, Toward a New Theory
of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. U.L. Ray. 571 (1955).
3. Rhode Island (1951); Louisiana (1952); Tennessee (1953); Alaska and
Hawaii (1959); Kansas (1960); South Dakota (1963); Connecticut (1965);
Massachusetts (1966).
4. An amendment comprising art. IX, § 1-3 was adopted Nov. 5, 1963, and
went into effect Jan. 1, 1964. Former art. IX, except sections 5, 6, and 8 was
repealed at the same time.
5. The municipalities, their 1960 population, and the year in which their
charter was first adopted are 'as follows: Berkeley (18,676)(1957); Bridgeton
(just over 10,000 as result of special census) (1966); Clayton (15,245) (1957);
Columbia (36,650) (1949); Ferguson (22,149) (1954); Florissant (38,166) (1963);
CoNsT. art.

(45)
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Only St. Louis and Kansas City adopted their charters prior to 1947. This
in itself is some evidence of the continuing vitality of the home rule~concept
in Missouri.
The term home rule serves as both a political symbol and a legal concept.7 As a political symbol it serves as a rallying point for those who
support local autonomy without undue interference by the state government. As a legal concept its basic function is to distribute power between
the state and local governments.8 Home rule lacks exact meaning when it
is used as a political symbol. Failing to achieve a consensus on specifics,
its proponents have tended to describe their goals in general terms. Since
the advocates of local autonomy usually have not given detailed content
to their program, most constitutional provisions drafted in response to
their urging have not provided precise answers to the complex questions
which arise when they are applied to concrete fact situations. 9 This failure
to develop clear goals and to translate them into constitutional provisions
capable of precise application is probably the chief cause of the failure
of home rule to live up to the expectations of its supporters, though the
10
courts have received most of the blame.
This article will deal with home rule as a legal concept and will focus
on the experience in Missouri. In order to understand and evaluate the
manner in which the Missouri home rule provisions distribute power between the state and home rule municipalities, it will be necessary to consider three basic issues: (1) the scope of power of a home rule city in the
absence of an express constitutional or statutory prohibition or authorization; (2) whether statutes or local enactments prevail when there is a
conflict; and (3) the legal status of the home rule charter. Since the first
two issues are frequently confused, it will be helpful to distinguish between
them at the outset.
The first goal of home rule proponents has been to provide municipalities with the power to act without prior authorization by the state legisHannibal (20,028)(1957); Independence (62,328)(1961); Joplin (38,958)(1954);
Kansas City (475,539)(1889); St. Joseph (79,673)(1961); St. Louis (750,026)
(1876); Springfield (95,865) (1953); University City (51,249) (1947); Webster
Groves (28,990) (1954).
6. Missouri's total population in 1960 was 4,319,813; its urban population
was 2,876,557. 1965-1966 OFFICIAL MANUAL, STATE OF MISSOURI, 1466.
7. Ruud, Legislative Jurisdictioni of Texas Home Ride Cities, 37 TEx. L.
REv. 682 (1959); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1964).
8. Sandalow, supra note 7, at 645.
9. Id. at 658.
10. Cohn, supra note 2, at 30.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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lature. They have thus sought to alter the traditional rule that municipalities
have no power except that which is delegated to them by the state legislature." Is this grant of power unlimited, in the absence of conflicting provisions in the constitution or statutes? If there are additional limitations,
what are they? In other words, what does the city attorney tell the municipal governing body when it asks him what powers the city can exercise
when there is no express authorization and no express prohibition.
Because legislatures have not hesitatedto enact laws affecting matters
which local officials have thought were of primary concern to municipalities,
these officials have also sought through home rule to impose limits on
the legislature's power to deal with home rule municipalities. This issue
arises in the courts when a charter or ordinance conflicts with a statute.
When the courts have held that the legislature's power with respect to
home rule cities is limited by the home rule provision in the state constitution, they have tended to rely on general formulas such as the statelocal or governmental-proprietary tests in delineating the boundaries of
the constitutional limitations. 12 The municipal enactment will prevail if
the activity or function is labeled as "local," "inherently municipal" or
"proprietary." The statute will prevail when the activity or function is
3
said to be "governmental" or of "statewide concern.'
Both of these issues are important and must be dealt with by those
concerned with city-state relationships. They can be analyzed and evaluated
with more clarity if they are considered as two distinct problems. It is
apparent that different considerations are relevant in the resolution of
these two issues. It is one thing to argue that there should be no limit on
municipal power in the absence of an express prohibition; it is quite another
thing to argue that some municipal enactments should prevail over conflicting statutes. There is a tendency on the part of both courts and commentators to fail to observe this distinction,' 4 and the Missouri courts are
no exception.
11. 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.00 (1958). The concept of
an inherent right to local self-government never made serious inroads upon the
doctrine of legislative supremacy over local government. Fordham and Asher,
Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 18 (1948); McBain,
The Doctrine of an Inkereht Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COL. L. Ray. 190

(1916).
12. See Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q.

385 (1953) for a discussion of the treatment of this issue by the Missouri courts.
13. See 1 Antieau, op. cit. supra note.11, at § 3.17.
14. Sandalow, supra note 7, at 650-652, 661-668.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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OF MUNICIPAL POWER IN THE ABSENCE OF A

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION OR PROHIBITION

A. Constrsction of tlhe Home Ride Provision
The Missouri Constitution states that "Any city having more than
10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt a charter for its own government,
consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the state...-1,
Commentators have referred to this language as confusing' 8 and as leaving
the matter of home rule in a state of ambiguity.' 7 Taken literally, the
only limits on municipal initiative imposed by this language are those
found in the constitution and in enactments of the state legislature. While
, it could be construed to devolve powers upon home rule cities which are
-coextensive with those of the legislature itself as long as the legislature
does not take positive steps to deny the power, it has not been construed
this broadly. Those commentators who have studied the court decisions
construing this language have concluded that not only must municipal
enactments be compatible with the constitution and laws of the state,
but that the initiative of home rule municipalities is limited to proprietary
functions and to governmental functions which "are of primarily local
concern"'P8 or "paramountly concern local matters."' 9 Such a reading of
the scope of municipal power is warranted by dicta in several opinions
of the Missouri Supreme Court, but there is justification for asserting that
the power of Missouri municipalities is broader than this. This assertion
can be substantiated by reference to the debates of the 1875 Constitutional
Convention, the actual holdings in several home rule decisions, and dicta
in other home rule decisions. It is more difficult, however, to suggest an
alternative formulation of the outermost reaches of municipal power in
the absence of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.
15. Art. VI, § 19. This language is substantially the same as that found
in art. IX, § 16 of the 1875 Constitution, except that the figure 10,000 replaced
the words "one hundred thousand." The power to frame a home rule charter was
granted to St. Louis in substantially the same terms in art. IX, §§ 20-23 of the
1875 Constitution. The St. Louis charter adopted pursuant to the authority' granted
in the 1875 Constitution is expressly recognized in art. VI, §§ 31-33 of the present
Constitution.
16. McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL .HOME RULE 124 (1916).
17. Schmandt, supra note 12, at 387. McBain and Schmandt were troubled by
.the ambiguity of the Missouri provision both as to the scope of municipal initiative
and as to its effect as a limitation on the legislature.
18. Id. at 405.
19. NICKOLAUS,

CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE IN MissoURI, 6 (Missouri

Municipal League 1966). The difference in phraseology between 'Professor
Schmandt and Mr. Nickolaus results because City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W2d 687 (1959), which laid .down the :"paramount
interest" rule, was decided after Professor Schmandt wrote his article. : ..
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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B. The 1875 Constitutional Convention

The delegates to the 1875 Constitutional Convention did not explicitly
discuss the scope of municipal initiative, probably because they were
uncertain as to the full significance of this new technique for dividing
power between the state and municipalities. 20 Since Missouri was the first
state to adopt a home rule provision, it would be surprising if the delegates
had anticipated all of the questions which have subsequently arisen. Some
insight can be obtained, however, by examining the situation which gave
rise to the home rule provision and the reaction of the convention delegates
to this situation.
The impetus for home rule came from the St. Louis convention delegates. Between 1865 and 1875, fifty-one special laws applicable to St.
Louis were enacted by the Missouri legislature, and additional special
legislation applicable to St. Louis County affected the city.21 The result,
when added to the special legislation enacted prior to this time, was a
patchwork of approximately one-hundred statutes directly or indirectly pertaining to the city.22 A leading advocate of home rule complained that
"our charter was the creature of the St. Louis delegation in the legislature,
23
and was subject to constant tinkering at the request of individuals.1
The St. Louis delegation's suggested solution to this state of legal
anarchy was a constitutional grant to the city of legislative power previously
exercised by the state legislature. They chose language which imposed no
limit on the exercise of power except the requirement of consistency with
the constitution and laws of the state. That they specified these limitations
is some indication that implied limitations, such as the requirement that
the power "paramountly concern local matters," was not intended.2 4 When
the courts read implied limitations on municipal power into the constitution and phrase these limitations in general terms, they take upon themselves
the power to decide whether the exercise of specific powers is to be permitted. However, by subjecting home rule charters to the laws of the
state, the draftsmen indicated that they were entrusting the legislature
with primary responsibility for curbing unwarranted municipal activity. The
20. See Sandalbw, supra note 7, at 658, fn. 63.

21. BAR cLAY, THE ST. Louis HOME RuLE CHARTERF
O 1876, 2 (1962).
22. Id. at 3, 4.
23. Id. at 4.
24. The rule of construction that the expression of some powers implies
the exclusion of .other powers was relied on in Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of
St. Louis,356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947); and City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel.
Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 1097. (1888).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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convention delegates sought to avoid the necessity for special legislation
for municipalities by transferring the initial responsibility for developing
m
a framework of municipal government from the legislature to the city.2
The existence of implied limitations is inconsistent with this avowed
purpose because implied limits create uncertainty. This, in turn, makes it
necessary for local officials to petition the, legislature more frequently for
legislation providing authority in these areas of uncertainty.
The major concern of the delegates to the convention was not the
scope of the initial grant of power. They were more interested in insuring
that this grant of power did not insulate St. Louis from legislative control.
Despite assurances from St. Louis delegates that the words "in harmony
with and subject to the Constitution and laws of Missouri" protected
against this eventuality, 20 some delegates even wanted to go so far as to
authorize the general assembly to amend or repeal the St. Louis charter
by special legislation rather than by general law.27 The Convention was
persuaded to accept in lieu of this proposal a statement that the General
Assembly retained the same power over the city and county of St. Louis
that it had over other cities and counties of the state.28 The point to be
made here is that the delegates were not worried about the initial exercise of power by home rule cities. They seemed to feel that if they could
establish the power of the legislature to step in and legislate generally to
correct abuses, this would provide adequate protection against ill-advised
action. This was an unspoken assumption of most of the delegates, but
delegate Johnson articulated this sentiment expressly:
. . . the only limitation there [sic] is placed upon thecity of St.
Louis having all the powers of a free and independent government
is that their charter which is their constitution, with their ordinances
which are their laws shall not come in conflict with an express
29
provision of the Constitutions or some general law of the State.

(Emphasis supplied:)
25. XII

DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUrIONAL CONVENTION OF

1875,

at 449, 450, 462, 463, 467 (1944).
26. Td. at 451, 457.
27. Id. at 448-455. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri
construing the constitutional prohibition against special legislation have, as a practical matter, permitted the legislature to do just this in most situations. See
e.g. Lebanon v. Schneider, 349 Mo. 712, 163 S.W.2d 588 (1942); State v. City of
St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 1 S.W.2d 1021 (1928); State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153
Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524 (1899); and City of St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 41 S.W.
1094 (1897).
. 28. Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2-5 (1875). XII DBATEs, op cit. supra note 25,
at 481, 482.
29. XII DEBATEs, op cit. supra note 25, at 478, 479.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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Lest the case be put too strongly, it should be said that some implied
limitations on the grant of home rule power in the Missouri Constitution
must be conceded. 30 For example, it is commonly understood that municipalities may not enact rules of law governing matters such as domestic
relations, wills, and other areas of private law. Although the convention
delegates did not discuss these matters, it seems obvious that they would
have denied any intent to vest such powers in municipalities if the question had arisen. The exercise of extraterritorial powers by municipalities
is another questionable area.3 ' While this much may be conceded, the
whole thrust of the convention's efforts does cast doubt upon a construction of the constitution that limits municipal legislative power to proprietary
functions and governmental functions "of primarily local concern" or
which "paramountly concern local matters."
The Constitution of 1945 does not modify the basic grant of home
rule power contained in the 1875 Constitution.3 2 It does extend the right
to frame a charter to all cities of more than 10,000 population. It also
prohibits the legislature from enacting laws "creating or fixing the powers,
duties or compensation of any municipal office or employment, . .
in a home rule city.3 Since the 1945 Convention did not address itself
to the scope of the basic grant of power, the debates provide no significant
insights on this issue.
C. The Case Law
From the adoption of the 1875 Constitution until 1905, the Missouri
Supreme Court approved every exercise of municipal initiative by a home
rule city -which was authorized by charter, did not conflict with a statute,
34
and did not run afoul of a constitutional prohibition. St. Louis v. Sternberg,
decided in 1879, upheld the imposition of a license tax on attorneys without prior legislative authorization. In rejecting an argument that the taxing power of the state had not been delegated to St. Louis, the court said
that:
30. See the discussion of this problem in FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUrIONAL
PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 21, Comment 5 (American Municipal

Association 1953).
31. See Sandalow, supra note 7, at 674-679, 692-700, for a discussion of the
enactment of private law and the exercise of extraterritorial powers by municipalities.
32., The language of art. VI, § 19 of the 1945 Constitution is substantially the
same as art, JX, § 16 of the 1875 Constitution.
33. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 22.
34. 69 Mo. 289 (1879).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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As neither state, county nor municipal government can be maintained without revenue, and as revenue cannot be raised without

the exercise of the taxing power in some form, it would follow as the
logical result of defendant's theory that St. Louis would be practically left without any government 3s
The court later approved the levy of license taxes on hotels36 and
sewing machine salesmen 3 7 without prior legislative authorization. It is
significant that these cases involved the taxing power, a power which
many courts have been reluctant to concede to municipalities in the
absence of authorization by the state legislature.38 Municipal enactments
were struck down or overridden during this period, but this occurred in
cases in which there were (1) conflicts with statutes,3 9 (2) the ordinance
was held to violate due process, 40 or (3) the municipal charter did not
authorize the enactment of the ordinance. 41 There was no suggestion that
some areas of activity were forbidden unless they were "of primary local
concern."
The opinion in the 1904 decision of St. Louis v.Meyer 42 distinguished
between matters of local and statewide concern, and suggested that statutes
would override ordinances only when they dealt with matters of statewide
concern. The issue in Meyer was whether home rule imposed limits on the
legislature's power over municipalities. But the idea that some areas of
activity were reserved for municipal action and other areas for state
action was developed in State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Teleplone Co.4 3 so as to limit the scope of municipal initiative even in the
absence of a conflicting statute. The supreme court held in Garner that
Kansas City had no authority to impose maximum rates for telephone
service within the city. There was no mention in the opinion of legisla35. St. Louis v. Sternberg, supra note 34.
36. St. Louis v Bircher, 76 Mo. 431 (1882).
37. St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo. 630, 7 S.W. 434 (1888).
38. See Cohn, supra note 2, at 32-41.
39. St. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (190*) (license tax on peddlers and hawkers); State v. Bell, 119 Mo. 70, 24 S.W. 765 (1893) (issuance of
dramshop licenses); State v. St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. 1, 22 S.W. 910
(1893) (procedure for extending railroad taxes); Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64
184) (appointment of election judges and clerks).
40. St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 41 S.W. 1094 (1897) (zoning).
41. St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197 (1888) (setting maximum phone rates).
42. 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (1904). The issue posed by this case--whether
home rule imposed limits on the legislature's power over municipalities-is discussed in the text accompanying notes 68-129 infM.
43. 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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tion which preempted the field or prohibited
conceded that the charter and the ordinance
maximum phone rates. It asserted, however,
ferred on the city "...
only powers incident
The opinion went on to say that:

such regulation. The court
authorized the city to set
that the constitution conto its municipality, .

There are governmental powers, the just exercise of which is essential to the happiness and well-being of the people of a particular
city, yet which are not of a character essentially appertaining to
the city government. Such powers the state may reserve to be
exercised by itself, or it may delegate them to the city, and until
so delegated they are reserved.4 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus certain "governmental powers" could not be exercised without
prior authorization by the legislature. Before the Garner decision, home
rule cities were justified in assuming they could embark upon activity not
forbidden by provisions in the constitution or statutes. After Garner, municipalities had to go further and ascertain whether the activity was "incident
to its municipality." New limitations were imposed on municipal initiative,
and they were couched in terms so general as to afford almost no help
to the cities in deciding what was permitted in the absence of a delegation
of power from the legislature. Moreover, the court formulated this new
rule without citing authority or even indicating where it obtained the
idea for this construction of the constitution.
Fortunately for Missouri municipalities, the supreme court did not
limit their powers as strictly as a literal reading of Garner would have
warranted. In 1912, the court held that the Kansas City charter could
grant jurisdiction to the city's municipal courts without legislative authorization. 46 In 1928, the court quoted the Garner rule with approval in
rejecting an argument by St. Louis that the home rule provision limited
the legislature's power to legislate regarding a municipal zoo. 47 Later in
the same year, however, the opinion in State ex rel. Carpenterv. City of
St. LoUis48 expressly limited the Garner rule. The court in this case rejected

an argument that a statute requiring a tax levy for the St. Louis public
library was void because it conflicted with the city charter. The court
44. State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., supra note 43 at

99, 88 S.W. at 43.
45. State ex rel. Garner, v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 189 Mo. 83,
99, 100, 88 S.WA1 at 43 (Mo. 1905).
46. State v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 451, 151 S.W. 716 (1912).
47. State ex rel., Zoological Board v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 1 S.W.2d 1021
(1928).
48. 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (1928).
.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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relied on Garner in reaching its decision, but it limited the rule laid down
in Garner by distinguishing between the use of the government-proprietary
distinction in dealing with conflicts between statutes and charters, and
the use of the distinction in setting the boundaries of municipal initiative
in the absence of a conflict. The court used the following language in
qualifying Garner:
That broad statement, however, may be qualified. The city's charter powers are not limited to its mere corporatefundtions. Between
that narrow field and territory occupied by general legislation is
ground upon which the city under its charter powers may venture
if it sees fit, but not contrary to general law, even though its action
is only local in its effect.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
This is one of the few Missouri cases in which the opinion indicated an
awareness of this distinction.
Even though the Carpenter opinion pointed out the necessity of
qualifying the broad language of Garner, the same language first used
in Garner was used again without qualification in the 1943 case of Kansas
City v. Frogge.50 Its use in this case did not create any real difficulty
because the decisive issues were whether the charter authorized a compensating use tax and whether the state sales tax preempted this field of
taxation. While the court held against the city on both issues, it did
concede that the city had the power to levy taxes that were authorized
by its charter and were not prohibited by statute or constitution.51 There
was no real need to rely on the language from the Garner opinion in order
to reach the result desired.
In Turner v. Kansas City,5 2 decided in 1945, the court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting fortunetelling for pay. Since there was no statute
authorizing the enactment of such an ordinance, the Garner case was relied
on to substantiate a request for an injunction against enforcement of the
ordinance. The court reviewed the Missouri decisions and concluded on
the basis of this review that ". . . the language used in the Garner opinion
49. State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis, supra note 48 at 892, 2 S.W.2d
at 719.
50. 352 Mo. 233, 243, 176 S.W.2d 498, 503 (1943).
51. Kansas City v. Frogge, supra note 50 at 241, 176 S.W.2d at 502.
The Plaintiff city's power to impose taxes is .... the power to impose
those taxes which has been delegated by the General Assembly under
statute or by its people under its charter, if unrestrained by constitutional
limitation. (Emphasis supplied.)
52. 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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is too broad, ....
,, The court also distinguished the Garner case from
the case before the court by pointing out that Garner involved the regulation of rates for telephone service. It said that this area of activity had
such a "high governmental prerogative"5 4 as to require a specific delegation
of power from the legislature.
Thus the test for finding the outer reaches of municipal power under
home rule was reformulated. Cities were not helpless in the absence of
legislative authorization in areas of activity labeled as governmental or of
state-wide concern. They could act on their own initiative as long as
they were not prohibited from doing so by constitution and statute and
they did not undertake a matter of high governmental prerogative. Inasmuch as the word "high" implies that something is important, one would
not expect the court to curtail municipal initiative by use of this test
unless the function in question is considered important. If the word "governmental" refers to the test developed by the court to decide whether ordinances or statutes prevail in the event of a conflict,5 5 one would expect
the test to be applied only to those municipal enactments which may be
overridden by a state statute. The high governmental prerogative test is
as vague and general as the other tests developed to deal with issues of
home rule. The experience in Missouri suggests that such word formulas
do not provide a great deal of help in deciding specific questions. On the
other hand, the words used and the fact that the test was formulated to
limit the Garner case indicate that the test should be used to limit municipal initiative only in exceptional cases. That the test has not been used
since its formulation in Turner is some evidence that it is appropriate only
in unusual cases. If this interpretation of the high governmental prerogative test is correct, it is superior to the test laid down in the Garner case.
In the cases following Turner, the Missouri Supreme Court has shown
no inclination unduly to limit municipal initiative in the absence of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition. The court has reaffirmed its early
holdings that municipalities may impose taxes without legislative authorization as long as the taxing power is not denied or preempted by the legislature. 5s In holding that the constitution grants power to home rule cities
53. Turner v. Kansas City, supra note 52 at 865, 191 S.W.2d at 616.
54. Turner v. Kansas City, 191 S.W.2d 612, 615 (1945).
55. See e.g. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913,
87 S.W.2d 195 (1935).
56. General Installation Co. v. University City, 379 S.W.2d 601, 603, 604
(Mo. 1964) (occupation license fee); Giers Imp. Corp. v. Investment Service, 361
Mo. 504, 510, 235 S.W.2d 355, 358 (1950) (assessment for sewer improvements);
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 655, 203 S.W.2d 438,
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to annex territory, the court stated that "[S]pecific legislative authority
to extend relator's limits is unnecessary."5 7 The court has approved the
enactment without legislative authorization of a Kansas City ordinance
making it unlawful for restaurants, hotels and motels to refuse to serve
8
persons because of their race or color.5
In recent years, there have been occasional statements in opinions
that the power of a municipality to legislate is confined to municipal affairs.5 9
These remarks are similar to those made in earlier years in cases such as
Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mah. Co., where the following statement was quoted with approval: ".

.

. the power of the municipality to

legislate shall be confined to municipal affairs." 60 Observations such as
these seem to be the basis for assertions by commentators that Missouri
home rule cities may legislate only as to proprietary matters and as to
governmental matters which "are of primary local concern" or "paramountly concern local matters.""' With the exception of the Garner case,
which was subsequently restricted, these statements were made in cases
442 (1947) (St. Louis earnings tax invalidated because it was not authorized by
the charter). Cohn siupra note 2 at 45, 46 has summarized the power of Missouri
Home rule cities to impose taxes in the following language:
If specific charter authorization can be secured from the local electorate
and if the legislature neither excludes nor pre-empts the tax source, the
cities can determine their own tax powers without the necessity of resorting
to the legislature for authorization.
It should be noted, however, that the court has been unwilling to find authority
in a charter to levy a tax unless the tax is specifically named. Text accompanying
notes 144-147 infra.
57. State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo.
374, 393, 228 S.W.2d 762, 771 (1950). Accord, City of Hannibal v. Winchester,
391 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Mo. 1965). Professor Sandalow considers the language quoted
from the Taylor case to be dictum because the power to annex is conferred by
statute. Sandalow, op. cit. supra note 7, at 694, fn. 198.
58. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
59. Hannibal v. Winchester, 391 S.W.2d 279, 293 (Mo. 1965) (dissenting
opinion); McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, 367 S.W.2d 498,
501 (Mo. 1963). The most recent statement was in St. Louis v. Golden Gate
Corporation, No. 52,568, Supreme Court of Missouri, November 13, 1967, where
the following statement was made:
Moreover, such proposed expansion of the power and jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court .

.

. would surely be considered a matter of state interest,

not authorized by the grant of charter powers for local government under
the provisions of Art. VI, Secs. 31-33 Const.
This statement was dictum since the city did not argue that its ordinance authorized
the Circuit Court to appoint a receiver. It argued instead that the ordinance
authorized the city to seek equitable relief to abate conditions created by continued violation of its Housing Code. The basis of the decision was the Court's
conclusion that the appointment of. a receiver as contemplated in the ordinance
was beyond the general powers of a court of equity.
60. 337 Mo. 913, 923, 87 S.W.2d 195, 200 (1935).
61. Schmandt, supra note 12, at 405; Nickolaus, supra note 19, at 6.
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which did not raise the issue of municipal power in the absence of express
authorization, and must be considered dicta. The opinions in these cases
made no attempt to point out the distinction between state-local conflicts
and the question of the scope of municipal power in the absence 'of such
a conflict.
D. Observations
Several observations can be made on the basis of this review of
cases and convention debates. It is obvious that municipal charters
and ordinances in conflict with the constitution will be invalidated when
challenged. In a few instances the Missouri Supreme Court has relied
on the governmental-proprietary or state-local dichotomy to hold that
a charter prevails over a conflicting statute, but in the great majority of
cases the conflicting statute has prevailed.6 2 While municipalities may not
embark upon a matter of high governmental prerogative without legislative authorization, experience indicates that this concept is not a serious
impediment to municipal initiative. Beyond this, the court has not provided a workable general test for ascertaining the outer boundaries of
municipal power in the absence of legislative authorization. Although the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is important
in deciding whether a statute or municipal enactment prevails in the
event of a conflict, its only use in determining the scope of municipal
power should be as an aid in ascertaining the applicability of the high
governmental prerogative concept.6 3 Statements in the cases that home

rule cities have legislative power only with respect to municipal or local
affairs or matters of primarily local concern cannot be squared with the
decisions discussed which have approved municipal taxation, annexation,
and civil rights regulation in the absence of legislative authorization. Municipal taxatioh, annexation, and civil rights regulation have been classified
62. The writer analyzed 55 cases decided by the Missouri Supreme Court
between 1879 and 1965 which involved municipal home rule. In 21 cases no conflict was found; in the 22 cases in which a conflict was found, the statute prevailed
in 18 cases, and the ordinance prevailed in 4 cases. The decision in the remaining
cases was based upon lack of authority in the charter; the unconstitutionality of
the local enactment; in the Garner case, upon a lack of power in the city in the
absence of legislative authorization; and- in several annexation cases, upon a conflict between a state statute and the procedure for charter amendment set forth in
the state constitution.
63. Contra, Schmandt, Municipal Home Ride in Missouri, 1953 WASu. U.L.Q.
385, 404, 405, (1953).
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by the court as governmental.6 4 When the court has classified something
as governmental in home rule cases, it has assumed that it is of statewide
concern. Matters of state-wide concern are, a fortiori, not matters of
primarily local concern.
One way of explaining the decisions would be to suggest that terms
such as proprietary, municipal, and local have one meaning if there is
no conflicting statute and another meaning if there is such a statute. While
the court has not stated that these terms have such a double meaning,
such an approach might be the only way to avoid an emasculation of
the grant of home rule power to Missouri municipalities.. If the court applied this limitation on municipal power consistently, and gave the same
meaning to terms such as local affairs in ascertaining municipal power and
in resolving state-local conflicts, municipal power in the absence of legislative authorization would be held to extend to progressively fewer
subjects.65 This result would follow because the supreme court would
be required to deny state control in order to allow the exercise of a particular power by a municipality. The supreme court would deny state
control in only a few instances. This is indicated because it has held that
statutes are superior to local enactments in the great majority of cases
in which an actual conflict was held to exist. 66
Still another possible explanation for the occasional suggestion that
cities have power only with respect to municipal or local affairs is that
the court is reluctant to concede sweeping municipal powers purely as
an abstract proposition. Viewed in this light, these occasional disclaimers
represent a hesitancy on the part of the court to commit itself to a general
proposition which might make it difficult to strike down some future offensive
exercise of power by a home rule city. A final possible explanation of
the inconsistencies found in the opinions is that they result from an inherently ambiguous constitutional provision coupled with a judicial unwillingness to distinguish between the various issues which are raised by a constitutional home rule provision. As such, the inconsistencies may be viewed
64. McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, 367 S.W.2d 498,
503 (Mo. 1963) ("annexation of additional territory is a matter of -more than
merely municipal affairs and concern . . ."); General Installation Co. v. University
City, 379 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Mo. 1964) ("The power to tax is a governmental function inherent in the sovereign people of the state . . ."); Marshall v. Kansas
City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962) (treating civil rights ordinances as an exercise
of the police power, traditionally labeled as governmental).
65. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 662, 663 (1964).
66. Note 62 supra.
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simply as a manifestation of the confusion caused by a failure to draft a
home rule provision capable of precise application.
III. STATE-LOCAL CONFLICTS

A. Construction of the Home Ride Provisions
The 1875 Constitution provided that home rule charters must be
"consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the State ... "
This language was retained in the 1945 Constitution. 6s Article 9, Section
25 of the 1875 Constitution, which was omitted from the 1945 Constitution
because it was considered repetitious, stated that, "the General Assembly
shall have the same power over the city and county of St. Louis, that it
has over other cities and counties of this State." A literal construction of
these provisions would permit a valid statute to override any conflicting
ordinance or charter provisions. However, the commentators who have
written about the 1875 Constitution seem unwilling to believe that the
framers meant what they said.69 This reluctance seems to stem from
their conception of home rule. They assume that home rule is meaningless
unless it provides some areas of municipal autonomy beyond the control
of the legislature. Subsequent judicial treatment of the home rule provisions
indicates that this concept of home rule has also influenced the Missouri
Supreme Court.7 Yet an examination of the convention debates indicates
that, with the exception of one delegate, the framers expected the home
rule provisions to be applied literally.
B. The 1875 ConstitutionalConvention
The intention of the framers of the Constitution of 1875 can be
ascertained by noting their reactions to an amendment proposed by Mr.
67. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875). The language of the provision dealing
with home rule for St. Louis was "in harmony with and subject to the Constitution
and laws of Missouri, . . ." Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, §§ 20, 23 (1875).
68. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 19. See art. VI, §§ 31-33, for the provisions dealing
with the St. Louis home rule charter.
69. "The constitution thus contained, on the one hand, declarations as to the
powers of home rule cities, and on the other hand, declarations as to the power
of the legislature over home rule cities that were highly inconsistent." BARCLAY,
THE ST. Louis HOME RULE CHARTER OF 1876, 17 (1962). "Clearly the constitutional provisions, read as to their letter, are very nearly inexplicable." McBAIN,
THE LAW AND PRcACICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 126 (1916). "Taken at face

value, this language would appear to indicate that what the state gave with one
hand it took away with the other." Schmandt, Municipal Home Ride in Missouri,
1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 385, 387 (1953).
70. The acceptance of the various versions of the state-local and governmentalproprietary tests described in the text accompanying notes 78-88 infra indicates
that the Court felt that some autonomy was implicit in home rule.
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Hale and a speech by Mr. Pulitzer, both on the morning of July 30, 1875.
Mr. Hale sought to amend the section granting home rule powers to St.
Louis by adding the following language:
provided that this section shall not be so construed as to prohibit
the General Assembly from amending, altering or repealing said
charter so adopted when ever it may be necessary for the public
interest.71
Mr. Gantt, a delegate from St. Louis, asserted that Mr. Hale's amendment
would conflict with the prohibition against special legislation. Further,
it was unnecessary because the language subjecting the charter to the
constitution and laws of the state would "leave our charters subject to
any general law upon that subject which the General Assembly might
at any time see fit to enact."7 2 A number of other delegates made comments
73
in a similar vein.
Only Todd and Pulitzer, both from St. Louis, argued for areas of
autonomy in which municipal enactments could not be affected by state
statutes. Todd would have preferred that charters be subject only to the
constitution rather than to the constitution and laws. He realized, however, that the proposed home rule provision would not accomplish this.7 4
Pulitzer, on the other hand, seemed to feel that the proposal would insure
local supremacy in some areas. After commenting on the type of general
law he thought St. Louis would be subject to under the proposal, he said:
So far as the administration of purely local affairs is concerned,
I hold that no General Assembly has the right, no General Assembly
should have the power to say by general law whether a certain
curbstone should be laid in one alley, or whether a certain sewer
should be built in another. I say that the principle of local self
government is violated if you leave it to those who are far away
from the seat of interest

. . .

to determine what shall be done in

a particular locality concerning anything.7 5
Beginning with Mr. Broadhead, another St. Louis delegate, who said "[W]e
don't claim and ask any such thing,"17 a series of delegates rejected this
71. XII
-

DEBATES

OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

,448 (1944).
72. Op. cit. supra note
73. Op. cit. supra note
74. Op. ct. supra note
75. Op. cit. supra note
76. Op. cit. supra note

71
71
71
71
71

1875,

at 452.
at 458, 460, 472, 475, 476.
at 471, 472.
at 461, 462.
at 464.
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concept of home rule. 77 These two incidents indicate rather clearly that

the members of the Convention felt that a charter would be subject to
any otherwise valid statute that did not violate the prohibition against
special legislation.
C. The Case Law
The early decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court dealt with this
issue by applying the constitutional provisions literally. Statutes were
held superior to any conflicting ordinances or charter provisions. 78 Over
a period of time, however, the court developed conceptual tests which are
based upon the premise that municipal enactments in some areas are
superior to statutes.7 9 The effect of these tests has been to limit the power
of the legislature to legislate with respect to home rule municipalities.
These tests do not necessarily result in the invalidation of statutes. Instead,
they may simply make particular statutes inapplicable to specific home
rule cities because of a conflict with a municipal enactment.80 In deciding
these cases, the court has not relied consistently upon any one formulation of the classic state-local and governmental-proprietary tests. In describing the areas in which a statute is superior to a conflicting local
enactment, it has labeled the function in question as governmental,8 ' of
statewide concern8 2 or of general concern. 3 In describing the areas in
which charters or ordinances take precedence over state legislation, the
court has used words such as proprietary,8 4 corporate,4 5 purely municipal, 8
77. Op. cit. suipra note 71 at 465, 469, 474.
78. See e.g. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64 (1884). For cases upholding
municipal power without consideration of whether the powers were local or
proprietary, see St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo. 630, 7 S.W. 434 (1888); St. Louis
v. Bircher, 76 Mo. 431 (1882); St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289 (1879).
79. See e.g. City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d
687 (Mo. 1959); Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company, 337
Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935). Schmandt, su.pra note 69, contains a good discussion of the development of these concepts and their use in deciding cases involving
conflicts between statutes and municipal enactments.
80. See e.g. In re East Bottoms Drainage & Levee Dist., 305 Mo. 577, 259
S.W. 89 (1924).
81. Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 161, 182 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1946);
Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 926, 87 S.W.2d
195, 202 (1935); State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 893, 2 S.W.2d
713, 720 (1928).
82. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382 S.W.2d 688, 693
(Mo. 1964).
83. State ex rel. Zoological Board of Control v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 924,
1 S.W.2d 1021, 1026 (1928).
84. City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d 687, 693
(Mo. 1959).
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local s" or essentially appertaining to city, government.88
While conscientious judges have periodically attempted to reformulate
these tests in an effort to bring some order out of the confusion,8 9 a careful
review of the cases makes it apparent that changes in phraseology' rarely
affect the outcome of specific cases. The latest statement of a general rule
illustrates the elusive nature of the quest. The Missouri Supreme Court
held in City of Joplin v. Industrial Comnission of Missouri"° that a state
law providing for a prevailing wage was superior to a charter provision.
After referring to both the governmental-proprietary and state-local tests,
the court quoted with approval from MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, as follows:
The real test, it seems, is not whether the state or the municipality
has an interest in the matter, since usually both have, but instead
whether the state's interest or that of the municipality is paramount.91
This language provides a realistic insight insofar as it recognizes that
both state and municipality have an interest in most matters in which a
state-local conflict arises. However, it is no more helpful than its predecessors as a test to determine whether state or local enactments prevail in
the event of a conflict. To say that the state or the municipality has a
paramount interest is just an alternative way of stating a conclusion
arrived at for other reasons. In most cases the municipality and its residents will be more concerned about and more intimately affected by a
decision to apply one law rather than another to a given situation. But this
is not a sufficient reason for concluding that local enactments should
prevail over state law. One can assume therefore that paramount interest
does not mean paramount concern. The decision in most cases which involve state-local conflicts is probably made on the basis of a judgment
by the court as to whether the public interest requires that the ultimate
85. Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 161, 182 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1944);
State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 893, 2 S.W.2d 713, 720 (1928).
86. Stanton v. Thompson, 234 Mo. 7, 11, 136 S.W. 698, 699 (1911); Kansas
City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 653, 29 S.W. 845, 848 (1895).
87. State v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368, 391, 283 S.W.2d 502, 522 (1955); In re
East Bottoms Drainage & Levee Dist., 305 Mo. 577, 585, 259 S.W. 89, 91 (1924).
88. State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & K. Telephone Company, 189 Mo. 83,
99, 100, 88 S.W. 41, 43 (1905).
89. See e.g. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913,
87 S.W.2d 195 (1935); State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870,
2 S.W.2d 713 (1928).
90. 329 S.W.2d 687- (Mo. 1959).
91. City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, supra note 90 at 693.
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decision be made by the state legislature instead of a municipal council.
If this assumption is correct, paramount interest refers to paramount
power and responsibility. Yet while use of words such as power is
preferable to the word interest, this too is a way of stating a conclusion
rather than a criterion for use in arriving at a conclusion. One commentator
has suggested that decisions on this- issue should be based upon the court's
judgment as to whether uniform regulation throughout the state is desrable or necessary; whether the state or local governments have traditionally
functioned in the field in question; and whether the municipal legislation
will have an important effect on people outside the city. 2 It is difficult to
tell from opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court whether or not these
factors have influenced the court.
In the absence of helpful general principles, a consideration of the
decisions resolving specific state-local conflicts is important. There are
specific holdings or dicta in the Missouri cases which indicate that statutes
will prevail over conflicting municipal enactments with respect to the following matters: elections; 93 the kinds of general taxes which may be imposed,
exemptions from taxation, and the manner in which taxes may be levied
and collected; 94 the licensing of certain businesses; 95 the regulation of public utilities; 98 making provision for courts and their jurisdiction;9 7 establishing and maintaining a zoo,98 public library,99 or art museum; 100 setting
salaries for court stenographers;"0 ' rates of pay and personnel policies in
the Kansas City Collector's office 10 2 and the St. Louis license collector's
office;' 03 the prevailing wage paid to employees of private contractors
92. 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.36 (1958).
93. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64 (1884).
94. Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943); Kansas
City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935);
Ex Parte Tarling, 241 S.W. 929 (1922); St. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W.
914 (1904); State v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 117 Mo. 1, 20 S.W. 910 (1893).
95. St. Louis v. Tielkemeyer, 226 Mo. 130, 125 S.W. 1123 (1910); State v.
Bell, 119 Mo. 70, 24 S.W. 765 (1893).
96. Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945); State
ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & K. Telephone Co., 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905).
97. Young v. Kansas City, 152 Mo. 661, 54 S.W. 535 (1899); St. Louis
v. Golden Gate Corporation, No. 52,568, Supreme Court of Missouri, November 13,
1967.
98. State ex rel. Zoological Board of Control v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870,
1 S.W.2d 1021 (1928).
99. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2"S.W.2d 713 (1928).
100. State ex rel. Bixby v. City of St. Louis, 241 Mo. 231, 145 S.W. 801 (1912).
101. Young v. Kansas City, 152 Mo. 661, 54 S.W. 535 (1899).
102. Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (1946). The opinion
in Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958), indicated that Art. VI, § 22
of the 1945 Constitution was enacted to overturn this decision.
.
103. Preisler v. Hayden,.309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958)-.,...
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working on municipal improvements;104 traffic regulation on city streets; °'
municipal police departments;10 education;1 0 7 and zoning1 s and other
manifestations of the police power. 10 9
There are specific holdings or dicta in the Missouri cases which indicate that municipal enactments will prevail over statutes with respect
to the following matters: special assessments and the procedure for their
enforcement;" 0 the procedure for condemning land for municipal purposes;'
the procedure for establishing drainage and levee districts located
exclusively within a municipality;1 2 and the opening and grading of
streets." 3 There is dictum in one case suggesting that municipal charters
supersede statutes on the question of establishing and maintaining parks
within a city." 4 The case cited to sustain this proposition actually dealt
with the condemnation procedure for taking land for parks.'' 5 In a later
decision the Court held that the subject of zoological parks was one of
state concern." 6 There is dictum in a 1958 decision that "the operation
of parks and recreation areas . . . has to some extent been held to be a
governmental function.""17 It is doubtful therefore that parks would be
considered a matter of local concern if a state-local conflict in this area
should arise.
It is also possible to question the assumption that the court has held
that the procedure for condemning land for municipal purposes is a matter
104. City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d 687
(Mo. 1959).
105. St. Louis v. Stenson, 333 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
106. State v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1959); State v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368,
283 S.W.2d 502 (Mo. 1955).
107. Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195
(1935).
108. Wippler v. Hohn, 341 Mo. 780, 110 S.W.2d 409 (1937).
109. Vest v. Kansas City, 355 Mo. 1, 194 S.W.2d 38 (1946);' Kansas City
v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935). However,
the Missouri courts jave not shown an undue inclination to find a conflict between
statutes and ordinances in the police power field. Schmandt, supra note 69, at 403.
• 110. Good v. Johnson, 299 Mo. 186, 252 S.W. 368 (1923); Stanton v. Thompson, 234 Mo. 7, 136 S.W. 698 (1911).
111. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845 (1895); State
v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1889).
112. In re East Bottoms Drainage & Levee Dist., 305 Mo. 577, 259 S.W. 89
(1924).
113. In re East Bottoms Drainage & Levee Dist., supra note 112 at 91.
114. In re East Bottoms Drainage & Levee Dist., 305 Mo. 577, 259 S.W. 89,
91 (1924).
115. Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642; 29 S.W. 845 (1895).
116. State ex rel. Zoological Board of Control v. St. Louis, 318 Mo6.870, 1
S.W.2d 1021 (1928).
117. Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Mo. 1,958),.
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of local concern. The cases usually cited as establishing this proposition
are State ex rel. Kansas City v. Field 18 and Kansas City v. Scarritt.119 A
close reading of the Field case reveals that it involved a conflict between
two state statutes. Moreover, the court said in that case that:
The proposition made for relator, that when any such city has
adopted a charter it is out of and beyond all legislative influence,
cannot be sustained. We held to the contrary in the case of Ewing
v. Hoblitzelle, . . .120
The opinion in Kansas City v. Scarritt stated that "[T]he act now in
dispute deals with subjects strictly within the domain of municipal government,. .. 111
2. But the basis of the decision was the court's conclusion
that the conflicting statute violated the constitutional prohibition against
special legislation and the provision of the constitution which limits the
number of classes of municipalities the legislature may recognize to four.
Annexation presents special problems. The Missouri Supreme Court
has indicated that this is a governmental function. 122 Other jurisdictions
are almost unanimous in holding that state statutes dealing with annexation supersede municipal charters. 23 The Missouri Supreme Court has
held, however, that the Sawyers Act,124 which requires cities to file a
declaratory judgment action prior to proceeding as otherwise authorized
by law or charter for the annexation of territory, conflicts with the procedure for charter amendments provided for in the constitution 2 This
decision was premised on the assumption that annexation in home rule
cities cannot be accomplished by ordinance but rather must be by charter
amendment 28 The court subsequently held that while a home rule city
cannot be forced to follow the procedure set forth in the Sawyers Act,
it can elect to do so.' 2 7 The municipality can avoid a conflict between the
Sawyers Act and the constitution by passing a resolution providing for
the filing of a declaratory judgment action prior to instituting the pro118.
119.
120.
(1889).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
City of
127.

99 Mo. 352, 12 S.W. 802 (1889).
127 Mo. 642, 29 S.W. 845 (1895).
State ex rel. Kansas City v. Field, 99 Mo. 352, 355, 12 S.W. 802, 803
Kansas City v. Scarritt, 127 Mo. 642, 650, 29 S.W. 845, 847 (1895).
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 367 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1963).
1 ANTIAu, op dt. supra note 92, at § 3.33.
Section 71.015, RSMo (1959).
McConnell v. Kansas City, 282 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1955).
See State v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762 (1950);
Westport v. Kansas City, 103 Mo. 141, 15 S.W. 68 (1891).
City of Hannibal v. Winchester, 391 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. 1965).
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cedure for a charter amendment. 12 In rejecting the argument in another
case that home rule charter cities are not subject to judicial review when
they extend their boundaries by charter amendment, the court indicated
that the standards for annexation provided by the Sawyers Act should
9
be considered in deciding whether a proposed annexation is reasonable.'
D. Observationts
When the conceptual tests developed by the Missouri Supreme Court
to deal with state-local conflicts are evaluated in the light of the results
reached in specific cases, one is forced to conclude that they have not
made a significant contribution to municipal autonomy. State statutes
have prevailed over local enactments in the great majority of cases in
which a conflict was found. Most of the powers essential to resolution
of the more serious problems confronting the cities-taxation and the
police power are obvious examples-have been held to be matters of statewide
concern. Although home rule municipalities have considerable autonomy
with respect to annexation, this has resulted from a procedural quirk rather
than from substantive principle.

IV.

THE HOME RULE CHARTER

A. The Legal Status of Home Rule Charters
The Missouri Constitution provides that "Any city having more than
10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt a charter for its own government . . . ."13 The grant of substantive home rule powers flows from the
grant of power to frame and adopt the charter. Thus the acquisition of
substantive home rule powers in Missouri is dependent upon the adoption
of a charter. This is the traditional' 3 ' and probably most desirableI 3 2
approach to home rule, although the experience in Ohio shows that it is
possible to draft a workable provision which grants substantive powers
38
directly to all municipalities without requiring the adoption of a charter.
128. City of Hannibal v. Winchester, supra note 127 at 283.
129. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 367 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1963).
130. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19.
131. FORDHAM, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME
RULE 19, 20 (American Municipal Association 1953); McBAIN, THE LAw AND THE
PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 668, 669 (1916).
132. Ibid.
133. See generally Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and
Practice,9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18 (1948).
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There are two possible conceptions of the legal status of the charter.
The charter may be thought of as an instrument which grants powers.
So conceived, a municipality may exercise only those powers authorized
in the charter. 3 4 The alternative approach is to treat the charter as an
instrument of limitation. 3 5 Under this concept, the charter serves "merely
to specify the limitations and restrictions upon the exercise of the powers
so granted [by the constitutionl . . . Therefore, any such power not expressly forbidden may be exercised by the municipality ......
1,11
The Missouri Supreme Court has assumed without discussion that
charters are grants of power so that municipalities may exercise only those
powers delegated in the charter. 37 The following language from the
opinion in Kansas City v. Frogge illustrates this approach:
The people of a city which has been granted the right by the people
of the state to frame and adopt a charter may not deem it desirable
or needful to delegate under the charter of their city all of those
powers which may be delegated by the legislature to cities organized
under general law. So the powers which plaintiff city may exercise,
through the constitutional grant of the right to frame and adopt
a charter, are those powers which the people of the city delegate
to it under its charter . . .138
B. General Welfare Clauses
A review of the construction of charters by the Missouri courts will
assist in evaluating the consequences of viewing the charter as a grant of
power. Most charters contain general welfare clauses which empower
the city to enact all rules and regulations deemed necessary. Since it is
difficult to anticipate in the charter all instances in which ordinances may
be needed and under the grant concept of charters authority must be
provided in the charter, a narrow construction of the general welfare clause
will have important effects on the ability of a home rule city to respond
quickly to its problems. The early case of City of St. Louis v. Schoenbusch
found authority in the general welfare clause of the charter to enact an
134. 1 ArrIEAu, op. cit. supra note 92, at § 3.05.
135. Ibid.
136. West Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 14
Cal.2d 516, 522, 95 P.2d 138, 142 (1939). Accord, Bank v. Bell, 62 Cal. App. 320,
217 P. 538 (1923).
137. Tietjens v. St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 222 S.W.2d 70 (1949); Carter Carburetor Cbrp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947); Kansas
City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943); City of St. Louis v. Bell
Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 1097 (1888).
138. 352 Mo. 233, 241, 176 S.W.2d 498, 501 (1943).
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ordinance prohibiting cruelty to dumb animals. The following language
from the opinion in that case reveals a disposition to construe such clauses
liberally:
. . . general welfare clauses are not useless appendages to the

charter powers of municipal corporations. They are designed to
confer other powers than those specifically named. The difficulty
in making a specific enumeration of all such powers as may be
properly delegated to municipal corporations renders it necessary
to confer such powers in general terms. 139
In Bluedorn v. Mo. Pacific Railroad Co.,140 the court held that the
general welfare provision in the St. Louis charter authorized an ordinance
limiting the speed of trains within the city. In City of St. Louis v. Bell

Telephone Co., 14 1 however, the court held that the general welfare clause
did not authorize St. Louis to enact an ordinance regulating telephone
rates. The court stated that the general welfare clause may be qualified
by specific provisions in the charter, and that it had been qualified in this
instance because the charter gave express power to establish rates for
some utilities but failed to mention telephone rates. Another significant
aspect of the opinion was the court's approval of the use of the Dillon
rule in construing charters: "[A]ny fair, reasonable doubt concerning

the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation,
and the power is denied."'1 42 In 1949, the court in effect repudiated the
liberal approach of the Schoenbiuch case when it said that, "[T]he general
welfare clause of the charter may not be construed so as to enlarge the
powers of a city further than is necessary to carry into effect the specific
143
grants of power.'

C. Municipal Taxation
Perhaps the most important cases turning on the construction of
charters have been those involving taxation. In People's Motorbus Co. v.
Blaine,' decided in 1932, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that
the broad language of the St. Louis charter authorizing the city to assess,
139. 95 Mo. 618, 622, 8 S.W. 791, 792 (1888).
140. 108 Mo. 439, 18 S.W. 1103 (1891).
141. 96 Mo. 623, 10 S.W. 197 (1888).
142. Id. at 628, 10 S.W. at 198.
143. Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 445, 222 S.W.2d 70,73 (19491).
The Court invalidated an ordinance which regulated rents because neither the
charter nor the statutes authorized such an ordinance.
144. 332 Mo. 582, 58 S.W.2d 975 (1932).
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levy, and collect taxes for all general and specific purposes on all subjects
or objects of taxation was sufficiently broad to authorize the city to levy
any kind of tax not inhibited by some other provision of the charter or
by some constitutional or statutory provision. This approach, if allowed
to stand, would have contributed significantly to the ability of Missouri
municipalities to meet their many responsibilities. Unfortunately, this
approach was expressly repudiated in the 1943 case of Kawsas City U.
Frogge'45 and the 1947 case of Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St.
146
Louis.
The Court invalidated Kansas City's compensating use tax in the
Frogge case and the St. Louis earnings tax in the Carter Carburetorcase.
The charters of both Kansas City and St. Louis contained the same
broad grant of taxing power relied on in People's Motorbus. They also had
a provision stating that the enumeration of any power should not be
construed to limit or impair any general grant of power. But the court
decided that this was not enough. Asserting that the taxing power must
be strictly construed, the court in effect imposed a requirement that any
taxes levied must be specifically named in the charter. These decisions
extended to all forms of taxation the limitation previously imposed by
the legislature on the levy of license taxes. 147
D. Observations
These cases illustrate the manner in which the autonomy and flexibility of Missouri municipalities have been undermined by the conception of charters as instruments of grant rather than limitation. The restrictive approach of Dillon's rule has been applied to the construction
of charters, although the philosophy which underlies home rule indicates
that it is limitations on municipal power which should be strictly construed
rather than grants of power. 48 The usefulness of general welfare clauses
was severely impaired when the court stated that such clauses may not
145. 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943).
146. 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947).
147. Section 71.610, RSMo 1959, prohibits the imposition of license taxes on
any business avocation, pursuit or calling, unless "such business avocation, pursuit
or calling is specially named as taxable in the charter . . . or unless such power be
conferred by statute." (Emphasis supplied.) General Installation Co. v. University
City, 379 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1964) held that this requirement may be satisfied by
incorporating into the charter by reference all license taxes which cities of the
first, second, third or fourth class or of any population group are now or hereafter
permitted to levy.
148. City of Grass Valley v. Walkinshaw, 37 Cal.2d 59S, 212 P.2d 894 (1949);
1 ANTiEAU, MUNICIPAL CoitroixtIoN LAw §§ 3.05, 3.09 (19158).
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enlarge municipal powers further' than is necessary to carry into effect
specific grants of -power. The task of raising revenue-perhaps the most
difficult responsibility facing the cities-was made more difficult by the
Frogge and Carter Carburetor cases. One of the usual factors prompting the adoption of constitutional home rule has been the desire to
free municipalities from the restrictive approach of the courts to legislative grants of power to municipalities. Yet the Missouri courts have
applied the same general approach to the construction of charters. An
important result of this reasoning is that municipal charters in Missouri
must be written in great detail.1 49 Since it is impossible to anticipate every
eventuality, and excessive detail is itself a limiting factor under applicable
rules of construction, Missouri home rule charters are less flexible and
less effective than they would be if they were treated as instruments of
limitation.
V. AN

EVALUATION OF THE MISSOURI APPROACH TO

HOME RULE

Missouri's home rule provisions and the case law construing these
provisions do not provide an effective arrangement for distributing power
between the state and home rule cities. With respect to the issue of scope
of power, the most important shortcoming of Missouri law is its failure
to indicate clearly what is and what is not a permissible exercise of power
in the absence of an express authorization or an express prohibition.
When a distinction is made between what the Missouri Supreme Court
has said and what it has actually held, one realizes that the court has
not sharply curtailed the power of home rule cities to act if there is
no specific prohibition or authorization. The Garner case' 5" stands alone
as an example of the invalidation of a municipal enactment solely because
of a lack of power to legislate in a particular field. In practically all of
the cases in which the Missouri Supreme Court has invalidated an ordinance
or charter provision, the decision has been based upon a conflict with the
constitution or a statute or upon--a finding that the charter did not authorize the ordinance. Yet because of dicta in cases involving conflicts
between statutes and municipal enactments, the outer boundaries of
permissible municipal action are 'shrouded in mists of uncertainty. 151
149. The Kansas City charter is described as "somewhat verbose" in STASON"
and KAuPEa, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 105 (1959). Yet the manner in which the
Missouri courts have construed charters makes such verbosity a necessary evil.
150. 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905)-.
151. See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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The conceptual tests developed by the Missouri Supreme Court to
deal with state-local conflicts are subject to criticism on several counts.
It has already been suggested that they are not compatible with the intent
of the framers of the constitution, 52 and that they have not made a
substantial contribution to municipal autonomy.15 3 Since the tests do
not provide a reliable guide for determining whether a city is governed
by a particular statute, many municipal attorneys play it safe and assume
that home rule cities are subject to all applicable state statutes.15 4 It has
also been suggested that these tests have undermined the initial grant of
power to home rule cities because of the tendency of some members of
the court to look to these tests in describing the boundaries of municipal
power.' 55 The experience in Missouri is comparable to that in other states
which have attempted to deal with the issues of home rule by using
similar conceptual tests. It has proven almost impossible to draw a firm,
clear line between local or municipal affairs and matters of statewide or
general concern.' 55 There are frequent conflicts between the courts of different states in the application of these tests to specific fact situations. 15
Even within a single jurisdiction, the courts are not always consistent.',,
An outstanding home rule scholar has said that, "it has been a fundamental
difficulty with the home rule concept from the beginning that public
affairs are not inherently either local or general in nature."'5 9
The case law dealing with municipal charters is a serious obstacle
to flexible and imaginative municipal action. It has been pointed out
that any exercise of power must be authorized in the charter, and that
charters are construed in the same restrictive fashion as legislative grants
of power.5 0 This line of cases has been particularly troublesome in the
field of municipal taxation.
152. See text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
153. See note 62 supra.
154. This statement' is based upon a number of conversations the writer has
had with Missouri municipal attorneys.
155. See the text accompanying notes 59-66, sltpra It should be emphasized,
however, that the statements by members of the Court on this point have been
dicta. As such, their chief effect has been to create uncertainty and to discourage
municipalities from relying on their home rule powers.
156. See Fordham, Home Ride-AMA Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REv. 137, 139
(1955).
157. 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 148, at § 3.17.
158. Ibid. The regulation of telephone rates has gone from local to state in
Colorado. In California, the regulation of traffic on the city streets has gone from
local to state.
159. Fordham and Asher, supra note 133, at 25.
160. See the text accompanying notes 137-149 supra.
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The confluence of these three lines of cases has created a situation
in which municipal officials do not believe they can rely with confidence
on their home rule powers as a source of authority, particularly with respect to new or unusual situations. Part of the problem may result from
a failure on the part of municipal attorneys to distinguish clearly between
these three lines of cases, particularly the first two. It may also be true
that some municipal attorneys are unduly cautious and perhaps overly
negative in their approach to home rule powers. It is usually easier to
say something cannot be done than to show how it can be accomplished.
But even the most careful reasoning and a scrupulous observance of all
relevant distinctions does not enable one to predict the outcome of future
cases on the basis of the Missouri case law with any degree of assurance.
The unfortunate consequences of this state of affairs can be illustrated
by pointing out what often happens when a- home rule city is faced with
a problem which calls for the exercise of a power not authorized by statute.
The city officials will normally request an opinion from their attorney.
Unless there is a case squarely on point, he will have to tell them that
there is substantial doubt as to their authority to exercise the power.
Local officials who lack the courage or the desire to deal with the problem
are thus provided with a plausible excuse for inaction. Those officials
anxious to do something may hesitate and lose some of their original
enthusiasm for action. Even when local officials remain united in their
determination to initiate action, the necessity for clarifying legislation
or for a test suit will delay the implementation of the program. If the
decision is to seek authorization from the legislature and the legislature
does not wish to provide such authorization, legal uncertainty may enable
members of the legislature to argue that the city already has sufficient
power to deal with the problem. A debatable point of law can be and often
is used to excuse inaction or place responsibility on someone else.' 6 '
Municipal requests for authority often take the form of proposed
legislation which is general in form but special in its effect. 162 An unduly
large amount of legislative time and energy is devoted to dealing with
numerous requests for legislation directed towards the special problems of
161. See Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Ride: A Role
for tke Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 656 (1964).

162. Although Missouri and most other states prohibit special legislation, the

approval of over-refined classification on the basis of population or other factors
permits legislation which is special in its practical effect. See Fordham, Home
Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REV. 137, 138 (1955). For a discussion of the
Missouri law on this point, see 2 ST. Louis L.J. 403 (1953).
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specific cities.' 63 This diverts legislators from their primary responsibility
for the formulation of state-wide policy. 164 Moreover, these requests for
what amounts to special legislation probably do not receive the careful
attention given to bills of wider applicability. Legislators tend to defer
to the local delegation on such matters. Even when the legislature is
guided by the local delegation, which can be expected to have knowledge
of conditions in ther district, it is less likely than municipal officials to
be familiar with the various ramifications of the problem which gave rise
to the request for legislation. 165 Since the local delegation to the legislature
is often elected on the basis of state-wide issues and is not charged with
the day to day operations of municipal government, it does not have the
same degree of responsibility to the local electorate on this type of issue
as elected municipal officials. Power and responsibility are thus divided.
It is at least arguable that the devotion of an inordinate amount of legislative time to dealing with special bills may cause the legislature to
decline in public esteem. 0 6 The use of the statutes is made more difficult
when they are unduly enlarged by the inclusion of numerous special acts,
since important acts of state-wide interest are lost among acts which
167
apply to single cities.
There are still other undesirable ramifications from the municipalities' point of view. The cities' bargaining power in the legislature is
weakened by the constant need to seek authority for the exercise of
new powers. In order to obtain the authority to exercise power in a new
field, the municipality may have to give up its request for other important
legislation. 168 Continually recurring requests by cities for local legislation
also establish precedent in the legislature and to some extent in the courts
for local legislation which is not desired by cities. 69 When the enactment
163. Clinton D. Summers, a third year student at the University of Missouri
School of Law, estimated that from ten to eleven percent of the bills considered
by the 74th General Assembly of Missouri (in the regular session extending from
January 4, 1967, to July 15, 1967) dealt with specific entities of local government.
He also estimated that 69 bills applied to the city of St. Louis alone. Summers,
Special Legislation in Missouri, submitted in Seminar in Local Government Problems (1967).
164. See Sandalow, supra note 161, at 655.
165. Id. at 656.
166. See Green, A MalaproprianProvision of State Constitutions, 24 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 359, 362 (1939).
167. Id. at363.
168. Professor Sandalow refers to a widely discussed rumor that Chicago once
had to abandon its quest for state-wide fair employment or housing legislation in
order to obtain the authority to reorganize its police department. Sandalow, supra
note 161, at fn. 51.
169. Id. at 654, 655.
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of laws applicable to a single city becomes commonplace, it would be surprising if the legislature did not use this technique to occasionally impose
its views on particular problems upon a city. The use of special legislation
frequently results in material discriminations between cities. One result
of all this is that some cities obtain economic or other advantages simply
because they have been more successful in their lobbying efforts.11 0
VI. A

PROPOSAL

While the Missouri Supreme Court could resolve some of the problems caused by the body of law which has developed in the home rule
field, the kind of thoroughgoing change that is needed can be accomplished
only through an amendment to the state constitution. Two distinct basic
approaches to constitutional home rule have been debated in recent years.
The more traditional approach, sometimes referred to as pure home rule,
was incorporated in early Model State Constitutions recommended by the
National Municipal League, 17 ' and still finds some support among proponents of home rule. 172 The newer approach has been advanced by the
American Municipal Association (hereafter referred to as AMA), 173 the
National Municipal League in the latest edition of the Model State Consti-

tution, 174 and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(hereafter referred to as ACIR).1 75 The newer approach has also been
embodied in the Texas Constitution as judicially construed, 1

6

the Alaska

7s

Constitution, 77

and was approved as
the South Dakota Constitution
179
in November 1966.
an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution
The traditional home rule approach distinguishes between matters
of municipal and statewide concern. The municipal charter supersedes
the statutes of the state if there is a conflict on a matter of municipal
170. Green, supra note 166, at 362.

171.

NATIONAL

MUNICIPAL

LEAGUE,

MODEL

STATE CONSTITUTION

ed. 1963).

97 (6th

172. Bromage, Home Rule-NML Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REV. 132 (1955).
173. Fordham, op. cit. supra note 131.
174. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 171, at 16, 97.

175.

1967 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON IN-

TERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 475, 476 (1966).
176. Art. XI, § 5; NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 171, at
98; Keith, Home Rule Texas Style, 44 NAT. Mum. REV. 185 (1955). Professor
Sandalow asserts, however, that the Texas Supreme Court has limited municipal

initiative in situations in which it would not have been permitted to do so under
the AMA proposal. Sandalow, supra note 161, at fn. 175.

177. Art X, § 11.
178. Art X, §§ 4, 5.
179. Art II, § 6.
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concern. State statutes override the charter in case of conflict on a matter
of statewide concern. The chief characteristic distinguishing this approach
from the newer approach is the attempt to carve out an area of municipal
autonomy in which local legislative action takes precedence over state
legislative action.' 0 The principal difference in the newer approach advanced
by the AMA is that, although adoption of a home rule charter automatically makes available to a city a broad range of powers, only "municipal
executive, legislative and administrative structure, organization, personnel and procedure" 18 are beyond state legislative control. The provision
recommended by the ACIR does not even attempt to insure autonomy
in these areas.18

2

Neither the AMA nor the ACIR provisions place any

substantive powers and functions beyond legislative control by general law.
Their purpose is to make it unnecessary to petition the legislature for
enabling legislation so long as the legislature does not expressly deny a
8
particular power..

3

Reference has previously been made to the fact that the Missouri
Supreme Court has so construed the existing home rule provisions that
it is necessary to distinguish between matters of municipal and state-wide
concern.' 8 4 While it has used different word formulas in making this dis-

tinction, the net result has been to set aside a few areas of municipal
activity which are not subject to legislative control. Although it may be
doubtful whether this result is justified' 8 5 this judicial construction of
the Missouri home rule provisions is consistent with the traditional approach. Consequently, the objections to Missouri's provisions, which have
been previously expressed, 88 apply with equal force to other approaches
which follow the traditional pattern. For this reason a new home rule
provision along the same basic lines, while it would doubtless accomplish
some constructive purposes, would nevertheless give rise to the same
difficulties that accompany any effort to distribute power on the basis
of distinctions which cannot be realistically or consistently applied.
The newer approach to home rule does not attempt .*to distribute
power between state and local government by the use of labels or a
fanciful characterization of the nature of the powers. Instead, it seeks to
180. See Bromage, supra note.172, at 133-135.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Fordham, op. cit. supra note 131, at 19.
Op. cit. supa note 175.
Fordham, op. cit. supra note 131, at 20, comment 2.
See text accompanying notes 78-88 supra.

185. See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.

186. See text accompanying notes 150-170 supra.
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reverse ,.the old strict-constructionist presumption against the existence
of municipal power. The issue of municipal power in the absence of statutory authorization or prohibition is dispatched by assuming that the municipality already has any power which the legislature could delegate, to
it. Thus, if the municipal attorney cannot find limitations imposed by the
legislature, he may assume that the municipality can exercise the power.
State-local conflicts become a matter of statutory construction since it
is assumed that the legislature can override any provision in a charter or
ordinance. 187 The emphasis, therefore, is on whether a conflict actually
exists, and what was intended by the legislature, rather than whether a
given function is of local or statewide concern. If the supremacy of the
legislature is limited in any respect, the areas in which limitations are
imposed are defined specifically and in functional terms. 8 8 A constitutional
amendment along the lines of the AMA draft would go a long way toward
erasing the present uncertainty concerning the scope of actual powers
which currently plagues Missouri home rule cities. It would make it easier
to ascertain whether the responsibility for particular problems rests with
the state or the cities. It should also lessen the workload of the state legislature.
Some commentators have criticized the AMA approach because it
does not protect cities from legislative inroads upon their affairs. 8 9 However, experience in Missouri indicates that the traditional approach does
not achieve effective autonomy either.1'0 The small measure of autonomy
obtained is at the expense of a debilitating uncertainty which undermines
municipal initiative. 191 Moreover, many serious urban problems involve
the urban fringe and intergovernmental relationships. Rigid local autonomy
might impair the flexibility and adaptability needed to cope with problems which transcend municipal boundaries. Retention of ultimate power
in the legislature would permit it to deal with this type of problem when

necessary.

92

187. Fordham,

MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS

FOR MUNICIPAL

HOME

RuLE 20, comment 2 (American Municipal Association 1953).
189. Id. at 21, 22, comment 7.
189. Bromage, supra note 172, at 133. Compare Fordham and Asher, :F"
note 133, at 24.
190. See note 62 and text accompanying notes 93429 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 62-67, 150-151 supra.
192. See Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement District v. Board
of County Commissioners, 149 Colo. 284, 369 P.2d 67 (1962) for an example of a
court's reliance on home rule to invalidate a statute designed to deal with 'a problem which transcended municipal boundaries. See Fordham, Home Ride-AMA
Model, 44 NAT. MUN. REv. 137, 141 (1955) for comments on home rule and metropolitan problems by the principal draftsman of the American Municipal Association's model home rule provisions.
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One very important difference between the traditional approach to
home rule and the approach of the AMA relates to who decides questions
of distribution of power between the state and cities. When powers are
divided on the basis of labels which are not capable of precise application,
the courts are forced to give specific content to the labels. This means
that under the traditional approach, the courts have the ultimate power
to establish the appropriate spheres of influence of the state and cities."Much of this power would reside in the legislature under the AMA approach, although the courts would continue to play an important role in
construing statutes and applying constitutional provisions which limit
municipal activity. One commentator has suggested that a constitutional
provision which limits the role of the courts as the AMA draft does
threatens fundamental values. 194 He points out that the legislature cannot be expected to foresee all of the problems which may arise, and that
the relatively narrow impact of many local measures may not arouse
sufficient general interest to motivate the legislature to impose limitations
to meet these problems after they arise. 195 He recognizes that judicial
power should be exercised only to invalidate a novel exercise of municipal power inconsistent with basic community values, and that these basic
ag
values are generally embodied in the state and federal constitutions.'
He asserts, however, that the avoidance of constitutional questions is sufficiently important to justify the retention of power in the courts to decide
97
borderline questions of municipal power on a non-constitutional basis.'
Certainly the principle that constitutional questions should be avoided
when possible is an important one. Perhaps the price paid is too great if
the principle can be furthered only by perpetuating uncertainty as to
the scope of municipal power. The serious problems faced by our cities
can be solved only by imaginative and vigorous efforts. Uncertainty as
to municipal powers has a debilitating effect upon the ability of local
officials to make such efforts. This uncertainty can be minimized by shifting the responsibility for certain decisions from the courts to the legislatures.
Moreover, since questions of the distribution of power are largely political,
193. See Bromage, supra note 172; Fordham, s.upra note 191. For criticism of
judicial participation in the resolution of home rule questions, see McGoldrick,
Lt,w ANr PRAMCPE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 1916-1930, at 310-312 (1933).
194. Sandalow, supra note 161, at 709-714.
195. Id. at 714.
196. Sandalow, supra note 161, at 718-720.
197. Id. at 720.
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there is something to be said for resting responsibility in an elected body
directly responsible to the electorate.
Rather than attempting to guard against the abuse of municipal
power by restricting the initial grant of power to home rule cities, the
newer approach to home rule focuses attention upon specific limitations
imposed by the legislature. The ACIR recommends that the delegation of
broad powers to municipalities be preceded by a careful review of affirmative limitations upon the powers of local government resulting in the enactment of a local code placing necessary limitations on the broad powers
granted. 9 8 The local government section of the proposed constitution
rejected by the voters of New York on November 7, 1967, would have
required the legislature to enact such a statute of-restrictions. 199 By focusing attention on specific limitations which would be contained in a single
comprehensive code, the newer approach to home rule would result in a
concentrated, comprehensive legislative review of the need for limiting
municipal power. Such a review might indicate that some existing statutory
limitations should be removed and that others should be added. The end
product should be superior to the existing hodge-podge of statutes and
decisions because it would be based upon an overall view of the whole
field. At the very least, such a local code or statute of restrictions would
be internally consistent and more accessible to attorneys who practice in
the field of municipal law.
The model provisions representing the newer approach to home rule
also deal satisfactorily with the issue of the legal status of the charter.
The AMA draft, for example, provides that a municipal corporation may
"exercise any power or perform any function . . . which is not denied
to that municipal corporation by its home rule charter, .... "20 It is clear
that such language would change the present Missouri law on this subject.
While Missouri home rule cities have only those powers authorized in
their charters, 201 the AMA draft provides that a city has all powers not
denied to it by its charter. Charters would thus become .instruments of
limitation instead of instruments which grant power.
A home rule provision similar to that recommended by the AMA would
provide a workable method for distributing power between the state of
198. 1967 STATE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 475 (1966).
199. Art XI, § 2(b).
200. Fordham, op. cit. supra note 187, at 19.

201. See text accompanying notes 134-138 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/9
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Missouri and" its' home rule mitiriicipali'ties." Of coursd truly satisfactory
relationships between. the st'ate and home rule cities. can be attained only
by continuing efforts by municipal officials and their friends before the
legislature and the courts, and by the creation of a climate of public
opinion sympathetic to the needs and problems of the cities. But an updated home rule provision would make an important and lasting contribution toward the achievement of this objective.
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